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Abstract
In this paper a model for the dynamics of inflation in Italy is proposed. It is shown
that both in the short and long run the inflation patterns can not be explained by a single
cause and that many theories contribute to determine the mechanism of price formation in
Italy. Changes in monetary and credit markets, along with substantial changes in many
sectors of the Italian economy suggest to split the sample period into two sub-samples
and modelling the dynamics of inflation differently for each of the periods. Moreover,
a robustness analysis rejects the hypothesis of a structural break associated with the
institutional changes occurred in 1999, with the adhesion to the EMU and the adoption
of the euro.
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1 Introduction
Price stability is a key goal of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, when the Member States of the
European Community decided to converge to a unified monetary policy and payment system
based on a new European currency, the Euro. Article 105 of the treaty explicitly says that
“the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks shall be to maintain price
stability”. Even once the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the adoption of the euro have
been reached, on January 1999, the mission of the European Central Bank (ECB) continues
to be the control of price stability and the dynamics of inflation in the Euro Area, see ECB
Monthly Bulletin (1999).
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Moreover, even before the Maastricht treaty, low-inflation countries such as Germany wanted
assurance that their EMU partners had learned to prefer an environment of low inflation to
avoid that the euro became a weak currency. The great efforts of high-inflation countries such
as France and Italy to approach the German levels have been however a strong economical
and political signal in favor of what Obstfeld called the “Europe’s Gamble” (Obstfeld, 1997).
Deciding to peg their exchange rates pursuing a common currency but experiencing different
and higher inflation levels could have twisted effects; first for the potential loss in competitivity
and second for the difficulties of these countries at curbing inflation after the loss of their
monetary policy autonomy.
The debate on sources and nature of inflation for the countries of the Euro Area has revealed
many interesting, but often controversial, results from both theoretical and empirical points of
view. This paper concentrates on the dynamics of inflation in Italy before and after the EMU.
The pattern of inflation in Italy during the period 1970-2006 might be described by indi-
cating four different phases. The ’70s are characterized by a strong increase of the inflation
rate while the subsequent two phases, separated by the exchange rate crises in September 1992,
when the Italian lira was heavily devalued and forced to leave the European Monetary System,
correspond to the two stages of the process of curbing inflation during the ’80s and the ’90s.
The last phase starts with entry into the EMU and is characterized by a low and stable level
of inflation.
At first glance, the dynamics of inflation in Italy over the three decades preceding the EMU
seem to confirm the validity of monetarist theories, see e.g. Fratianni and Spinelli (2001).
The high inflation rates in the ’70s could be explained by the expansionist monetary policy
adopted to minimize the costs to finance the growing public debt. Furthermore, it would
appear reasonable to consider the curbing of inflation in the ’80s and ’90s as the result of the
tight monetary policy adopted by the authorities to pursue the objective of price stability.
Bertocco (2002), however, criticizes the monetarist interpretation. In fact, in order for the
monetarist view to be effective, the policy instrument should be a (totally exogenous) supply of
money, and disequilibria in the money market will only be reflected in prices through changes
in aggregate demand. Bertocco argues that all these assumptions are questionable for the
present sample. The wide recourse to the cost-push explanations by all the Governors in the
investigated period is also an argument in favor of the idea that inflation dynamics can not be
explained by monetary phenomena only.
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Within this line, several authors have recently postulated a long-run (negative) relation
between inflation and the markup, see Banerjee et al. (2001) and reference therein. Even in
the long run high levels of inflation may represent a cost for firms either because they lead to
greater competition reducing the markup, or because of the difficulties for price-setting firms
to adjust prices in an inflationary environment with incomplete information1.
All these papers, however, have addressed at each causes of inflation separately. The effort,
in the present paper, is to collect all possible determinants in a single framework and try to
explain the marginal contribution to the dynamics of the Italian inflation, both in the short and
long run. In a previous paper Acconcia (1994) proposed a similar approach and investigated
the contribution of disequilibria in the money market, labour market and foreign market in
explaining the Italian inflation over the period 1973-1991. Our approach is an extension, in
several directions, of the one proposed by Acconcia (1994).
First of all, following Hendry (2001), we do not exclude a priori any theoretical explanation
for the Italian inflation and include in our model indicators from both demand and supply sides
of the economy. In particular, we observe how inflation reacts to disequilibria from the main
sectors of the economy: money and credit markets, goods and services market, labour market,
wage and price formation, import prices, exchange rate and productivity effects. Equilibrium-
correction terms have been proposed for all of these sectors. Because of the high dimensionality
of the information set, the analysis of each sector has been conducted separately, while all the
disequilibrium terms have been reported in a multivariate structural model for the inflation
dynamics, differently from Acconcia (1994) who considered only a univariate equation for the
Italian inflation. The methodology thus consists of a two-step procedure where, in the first
one, we estimate the equilibrium relations through multivariate cointegration models, and in
the second we include all the disequilibria in a model for the Italian inflation.
The third extension, instead, concerns the investigation sample, which has been enlarged by
1Banerjee and Russell (2001) employ cointegration techniques to investigate such empirical issue in the G7
economies while Banerjee et al. (2001) concentrate on the case of Australia. Bertocco et al. (2002) apply
the same tools on Italian quarterly data over the period 1970-98. Despite very different monetary regimes
occurred within the whole sample period, they find a stable long-run relation connecting the Italian price index,
unit labor costs and import prices. The connection between the markup and inflation sheds some light on the
importance of the supply-side effects on price dynamics. Juselius (2001) also presents evidence of cost-push
effects on inflation, as a consequence of higher cost of capital due to an increase of the interest rate by the
monetary authorities as an instrument for curbing inflation.
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considering the four decades from 1970 to 2006. Over this four decades, substantial changes in
many sectors of the Italian economy occurred during the first years of the ’80s, as well as the
transition from the national to the common monetary policy pursued by the ECB at the end
of the ’90s. These considerations suggest the possibility of changes in the equilibrium relations
and in the dynamic evolution of the variables.
If the beginning of the ’80s have been characterized by numerous changes in many sectors
of the Italian economy, the launch of the stage Three of the EMU can not be considered of
minor importance when the attention of the study is fastened on one of the primary objectives
of the reform. Among the primary objectives, in fact, there is the desire to build an area
of monetary stability and to reinforce the EU single market by eliminating any differences in
the units of account, and hence making the price system more efficient and transparent. This
suggests that the central objective behind the creation of the euro was to change something in
the way prices are determined. Angeloni et al. (2006), using micro data on consumer prices
and sectorial inflation rates from six euro area countries, find no evidence that anything has
changed around 1999. Whether or not the beginning of the EMU represented a structural
change seems to be still an argument for further research. What is clear, however, is that many
factors, such as input costs or product markets harmonization, which might play a relevant role
in the determination of prices in the short run, could be influenced by the EMU, although the
consequences on prices are not direct and immediate.
Another current of the recent literature, instead, concentrates on the inflation differences
that seem to persist even some years after the launch of the euro. After converging sharply in
the 1990s, national inflation rates started to diverge again around 1999. Although recently the
differentials have closed somewhat, stylized facts show that inflation differentials are larger and
more persistent than, for example, in the United States (see, among many others, Angeloni and
Ehrmann, 2004).
In both streams of research, hence, understanding the determinants of inflation is of ex-
tremely importance in order to determining which policy intervention might better perform in
the realignment of inflation rates in the EU. This is exactly the aim of the present paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the data series to be analyzed
and highlight some important features of the Italian economy over the investigated period. In
Section 3 we present the equilibrium relations which might have a role in explaining the dynam-
ics of the Italian inflation. Section 4 presents the general model and discusses the process of
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Figure 1: price indicator and money supply, in levels and first differences.
reduction to a simple and interpretable model for the Italian inflation. Some policy implications
can also be found in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical Perspective and Descriptive Analysis
The sample data are quarterly observations covering the period 1970:1 to 2006:4. As already
introduced above, many sectors of the Italian economy have experienced substantial structural
changes over the investigated period. In this section we briefly discuss the main economic
features that characterized the sample period under investigation.
The pattern of inflation over the sample period is characterized by first increasing and then
persistent high levels over the ’70s, decreasing levels over the ’80s while low and quite stable
levels over the ’90s and during the first years of the EMU. This is clear by observing Figure 1,
where the inflation rate ∆pt is measured as first differences of the log of the price indicator, pt.
In Figure 1, the price indicator and the inflation rate are compared with level and growth rate
of the money supply (mt and ∆mt, respectively). The very similar path between growth rates
of pt and mt over the whole sample represents the basis of the monetarist interpretation of the
Italian inflation provided by Fratianni and Spinelli (2001). According to this interpretation,
the expansionist monetary policy adopted to minimize the costs to finance the growing public
debt is the cause of the high inflation during the ’70s, while the subsequent restrictive monetary
policies acted in the ’80s and ’90s completely joined the objective of price stability.
Figure 2 shows the bond and inflation rate spread. Despite some turbulent periods cor-
responding to the two oil shocks and the speculative attack to the Italian lira, the bond and
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Figure 2: liquidity ratio, interest rate-inflation and bond-deposit rate.
inflation rate spread remains almost constant on three different values: a negative real interest
rate before 1982, a positive one before the entry in the EMU, and around zero during the EMU.
The simple graphical inspection of the main characteristics of the Italian money market
highlights the possibility of two structural breaks. The first one occurred around the beginning
of the ’80s, as a consequence of the fundamental changes associated to the role and the instru-
ments used by the central bank, the relationships between the central bank and the government,
and the increased economic integration within Europe2. The second structural break, instead,
could be ascribed to the entry to the EMU and the abandonment of the national monetary
authority.
The different objectives of the Italian Central Bank pursued before and after the first years
of the ’80s is a further possible cause of the presence of a structural break around these years.
In fact, during the ’60s and the ’70s the monetary authorities mainly aimed at preventing
disequilibria in the balance of payments. The quantity of credit, rather than the quantity
of money, was regarded as the intermediate target of monetary policy3. In this context, an
administrative ceiling on the expansion of credit and a security investment constraint were
imposed to the banking system from 1973 to 1983. From the mid ’80s, however, the high
inflation rate, the increasing public deficit and the participation of the Italian lira to the ERM
2The independence of the Banca d’Italia from the Treasury was formally announced in 1981, even if it became
really effective after a transition period of approximately two years. At the same time, the EMS, started in
1979, necessitated a further agreement in March 1983, in order to stop the frequent realignments and join an
almost fixed exchange rate zone.
3See e.g. Bertocco (1997) and Cotula and Micossi (1977).
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Figure 3: quantity of real loans in levels and first differences.
changed the objective of the Central Bank and the quantity of money became the intermediate
target of monetary policy. Since 1984, an annual target for the expansion of M2 was officially
declared, even if not completely respected (see Bertocco, 2002), while the removal of credit
ceiling increased competitiveness among banks, inducing a very large reduction of bank holdings
of government bonds from the second half of the ’80s. In Figure 3, the quantity of loans strongly
highlights the expansionist behavior of banks after the removal of the credit ceiling.
Structural changes however, do not involve monetary transmission mechanism only, but
characterize many other sectors of the Italian economy. Marcellino and Mizon (2001a, 2001b),
in modelling real wages, prices, productivity and unemployment in Italy for the period 1970-
1994, find strong empirical evidence of a structural change around the beginning of the ’80s.
The wage indexation law “Scala Mobile”, introduced in 1975 and reformulated many times
before being abolished in 1992, and the decline in union power during the post-1980 period
might be possible explanations to the different behavior of the labour market before and post
the first ’80s4. All these considerations seem to strongly confirm the presence of a structural
break in many sectors of the Italian economy, at the beginning of the ’80s.
Another fundamental step of the Italian economy, as well known, is represented by the
decision to join the EMU with the first group of countries in 1999. Such a decision, in some
sense, obliged the Italian economic authorities to make enormous efforts in order to approach the
most virtuous countries and respect the economics constraints as postulated by the Maastricht
treaty in 1993.
Thinking at the 1999 as a structural break, thus, could be a simplified representation of the
reality, in that structural changes could have occurred well before the birth of the euro. This
4See e.g. Erickson and Ichino (1994) and Bertola and Ichino (1995) for the impact of the “Scala Mobile” on
the Italian economy.
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point is still the object of an animated debate in the literature, which seems to confirm that,
at list for the mechanism of price formation, nothing has changed around 1999 for many euro
area countries5.
In Table 1 we report the correlations between inflation and a set of possible explanatory
variables. The correlations have been calculated both for the entire period and for some sub-
periods, in line with the discussion above. What emerges, at first glance, is that all the variables
taken in consideration, at least for a single sub-period, present relevant unconditional corre-
lations with the inflation rate. Moreover, some of these correlations are completely different
among the sub-periods, providing a further partial evidence of the presence of structural changes
characterizing the Italian economic framework over the last four decades.
In the next two sections we propose theoretical and empirical evidences of the relations
between all these variables and the inflation dynamics, both in the long and short run.
∆2p
1970-82 1983-98 1999-2006 1983-2006 1970-2006
∆2m 0.17 -0.30 0.04 -0.12 0.02
∆y 0.25 0.13 -0.05 0.04 0.19
∆2pm 0.56 -0.11 -0.27 -0.16 0.34
∆2ulc 0.05 -0.11 0.66 0.40 0.17
∆2w 0.20 0.00 0.78 0.55 0.31
∆u 0.09 0.00 0.30 0.06 0.08
∆2debt -0.45 -0.22 0.19 0.08 -0.26
∆ib 0.22 0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.17
∆id 0.23 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.18
∆r -0.10 -0.30 -0.10 -0.08
∆loand -0.15 -0.26 -0.16 -0.08
∆ρ 0.18 0.02 -0.10 0.27
Table 1: correlations between inflation and other variables. All variables have been appropri-
ately differenced in order to become stationary.
5See, e.g. Angeloni et al. (2006).
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3 The Inflation Dynamics in the Long Run
The idea of the paper is that many theories could potentially contribute to a joint explanation of
inflation in Italy. This is in the spirit of Hendry’s (2001) view that no single-cause explanation
is sufficient to describe inflation dynamics in the UK over the last century. In this section we
first briefly introduce the most relevant theories and then we discuss and construct the empirical
measures incorporated into the inflation model presented in the next section.
Fratianni and Spinelli (2001) assert that the Italian inflation experience is strong evidence
in favor of the monetarist theory, in the earlier version of Friedman (1956, 1969) and Friedman
and Schwartz (1963). This interpretation, however has raised many relevant issues letting
researchers to asking whether the pure monetary interpretation was the most appropriate for
the Italian case.
The narrative approach in Bertocco (2002), the explanations proposed by all the Governors
in the Bank of Italy yearly reports in the period as well as the empirical analysis in Bertocco et
al. (2002), emphasize the importance of supply side effects in price dynamics. Other important
contributions in this sense can be found in relations for wage determination which depend on
unemployment, productivity, taxes and policy interventions.
During the last few years, some researchers have focused on banks’ credit as a channel for
the transmission of monetary policy. In fact, the limited development of financial markets with
respect to other developed countries and the consequent strong dependence of the production
sector on bank loans make Italy as an interesting case study to test for the existence of an
additional channel for the transmission of monetary policy6. Alongside the traditional money
channel, thus, the credit channel could play a further and important role in the explanation of
the Italian inflation path, particularly after the abolition of the credit ceilings.
However, as argued by Hendry (2001), the most natural explanation of price behavior is
the role played by final demand which rises prices to “ration” goods to those most willing to
pay. Measures of the excess demand of goods and services with respect to the sustainable
production, such as the output gap, can be useful in explaining and forecasting inflation.
The empirical analysis, in this paper, is based on a two step procedure. In the first step
we investigate separately all the different aspects of the Italian economy through cointegrated
6Fanelli and Paruolo (2003), Bagliano and Favero (1997) and Buttiglione and Ferri (1994) find that the credit
channel effectively operates since 1983, which corresponds to the abolition of the credit ceiling, till the entry of
Italy to the EMU.
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VAR models which appropriately exploit the time series properties of the variables involved.
In the second step, we include all disequilibria from the mentioned equilibrium relations in a
structural error correcting model for explaining the Italian inflation. The choice of a two step
procedure is mainly due to the dimensionality of the information set which would make a single
cointegration analysis clearly infeasible.
Here below, we present the separate cointegration analyses for the relevant economic sectors:
money, credit, fiscal policy, final demand, markup, wages and unemployment. In Section 4,
instead, we present a structural model for the Italian inflation which collects all the aspects
discussed in the present section7.
3.1 Money and Credit
As already mentioned, the aggregate demand transmission channel can be seen as the resultant
of two channels: a money and a credit channel, see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Gertler
and Gilchrist (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995). In this work we consider both transmission
channels as possible determinants of inflation dynamics.
Before the EMU, the monetary transmission mechanism has experienced many structural
changes, especially around the first ’80s. From the point of view of the money channel, the
common result seems to be that a stable money demand relation can be estimated only for the
period 1982-988. After the entry into the EMU, instead, it seems not very realistic to talk about
a demand for money when the measured quantity of money is only an indirect consequence of
the effective monetary policy. About the credit channel, all empirical contributions concentrate
on the period following the abolition of the credit ceilings in 1983. Consequently, the analysis
of both transmission channels focuses on the period 1983-98.
Based on the theoretical framework proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) we expect at
least three equilibrium relations in the money and credit markets: a money demand equation,
a loans demand equation, and a relation for the interest rate on loans. Moreover, over this
sample period we expect a stable real interest rate, as shown in Figure 2.
In the money market, thus, we expect a standard money demand relation, where the real
quantity of money is a function of the opportunity cost of holding money. In the credit market,
instead, we suppose that the banking system fixes the price of credit by following the markup
7Calculations were performed in PcGive 10.0, see Doornik and Hendry (2001).
8See, e.g. Juselius (2001), Fanelli and Paruolo (1999), Angelini et al. (1994), Bagliano and Favero (1992).
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rule, where the lower threshold of the financial intermediation activity is represented by the
deposit interest rate. The price of credit, thus, will be a function of the levels of interest rates
in the market and an indicator of the business cycle. On the other side, the demand for loans
can be modelled as a standard demand function, where the quantity of loans is a function of the
GDP, the cost of credit, and the level of interest rates in the market, indicating an alternative
way of financing.
The information set consists of eight variables: the real stock of money (mt − pt), the real
GDP yt, the average interest rate on Treasury Bills at different maturities (3, 6, 12 months)
ibt, the nominal interest rate on deposits idt, the inflation rate ∆pt, the quantity of loans in
real terms loant, the nominal interest rate on loans ρt, the stock of total reserves held by
commercial banks at the Central Bank rt. All variables are expressed in logarithmic terms,
except the interest rates. A restricted trend is included in the statistical model, as well as
unrestricted centered seasonal dummies in order to account for the strong seasonality of the
money aggregate9. The analysis has been conducted through the I (1) cointegration procedure
proposed by Johansen (see Johansen, 1996 for a detailed discussion on such procedure). Among
the five cointegrating relations suggested by the trace test, as expected three of these directly
refers to the money and credit channels.
The money demand relation connects the inverse log velocity of money (mt − pt − yt) to the
opportunity cost measured as the spread between the interest rates determined by the market
ibt, and the deposit interest rate idt. The estimated excess-demand relation is:
êmt = (mt − pt − yt) + 0.53
(0.28)
(ibt − idt) + 0.0084
(0.0002)
t+ const (1)
where standard errors of coefficients are reported in parentheses, as in all other estimated
relations hereafter in the paper.
Regarding the credit market, the long-run relationships for the interest rate on loans is
êρt = ρt − ibt − 0.37
(0.04)
idt − 0.028
(0.0035)
(yt − rt) + const (2)
9All variables seem to behave as I (1) processes although the test procedure proposed by Rahbek et al. (1999)
suggests the presence of one I(2) common trend. A simple graphical inspection of the series would suggest
the real loans to be approximated by an I(2) process although the difficulties in giving plausible economic
interpretation of this phenomenon makes preferable to treat the system as integrated of order one, paying,
however, particular attention on the interpretation of the results. See Fanelli and Paruolo (2003) for similar
conclusions.
11
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5
5
1 0
i- i  d e p o s it  in v e r s e  m o n e y  v e lo c it y  
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5
1 0
2 0
i  i  d e p o s it  
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5
-3 .2 5
-3 .0 0
-2 .7 5
-2 .5 0
d is e q u ilib r ia  f r o m  t h e  m o n e y  d e m a n d  r e la t io n  
Figure 4: inverse money velocity, interest rates on bonds and deposits, and money demand
relation over the period 1983-98.
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Figure 5: interest rates on loans, deposits and bonds, velocity of reserves, loans-bonds spread
and disequilibria from the stable interest rate on loans.
where the stock of reserves rt is also included in that, owing to reserve requirement and its
influence on excess reserves, monetary policy affects the interest rate on loans. The quantity
(yt − rt) can be interpreted as the “velocity” of reserves.
The estimated excess demand for credit, instead, is
êlt = (loant − yt) + 7.5
(1.13)
ρt − 15.1
(1.14)
ibt − 0.014
(0.001)
t+ const (3)
where (loant − yt) represents the inverse of the “velocity of credit”. The relationships (2) and
(3) describe the credit market in a very simple way; this implies that the stock of loans observed
in the credit market is demand-determined, in the sense that, in equilibrium, the banking system
supplies whatever amount of credit the private sector demands at the pre-set value of ρt.
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Figure 6: inverse loan velocity and disequilibria from the stable quantity of loans.
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, even after the start of the EMU, the two relations for the
credit market continue to be quite stable, but on a different value with respect to the previous
period. Such different means could be explained with the realignment of the reserve coefficients
with the other European countries, which caused an enormous reduction in the reserves held
by commercial banks at the Central Bank10.
Concerning the loading coefficients, reported in the Appendix B, it is interesting to note
that the inflation rate responds significantly to excess of money and credit, while credit interest
rates higher than the equilibrium level contribute at reducing inflation. All the other coefficients
show the expected signs.
3.2 Markup, Labour Costs and Import Prices
High levels of inflation may represent a cost for firms either because they lead to greater
competition reducing the markup, or because of the difficulties for price-setting firms to adjust
prices in an inflationary environment with incomplete information. Empirical results seem to
confirm the existence of a long-run (negative) relation between inflation and the markup, see
Banerjee et al. (2001) and reference therein11. In the long run, the domestic general price level
is determined by the markup over total unit costs net of the cost of inflation. Under the linear
homogeneity assumption, this relation can be formulated as follows:
zt = pt − γulct − δpmt − η∆pt = qt − η∆pt (4)
10The reserve coefficient for the Italian banks has been reduced at 9% in June 1998, at 6% in August and
subsequently at 2.5% in December of the same year. Since January 1999, the reserve coefficient is at 2% for all
european banks.
11See also Franz and Gordon (1993) for a revision of the literature of the markup model considered in this
analysis.
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Figure 7: GDP deflator, import prices and unit labour costs in levels; markup over labour costs
and over imports in levels and first differences; deviations from the markup-inflation equilibrium
relation. All series are in log terms.
where zt is the retail markup over costs at time t net of the costs of inflation while qt is the
‘gross’ markup; ulct is a measure of nominal unit labour costs, pmt is the nominal import price
index and ∆pt is the inflation rate.
After some simple algebra, the empirical formulation of the retail markup model (4) can be
rewritten as
(pt − ulct) + β1 (pt − pmt) + β2∆pt = ezt (5)
where β1 = δ/γ, β2 = −η/γ and ezt = zt/γ is stationary for the markup relation to hold
in the long run. Thus, when considering the information set Xt = (pt − ulct, pt − pmt,∆pt),
we expect one cointegration relation that involves the variables as explained in the theoretical
model above.
Disequilibria from the long-run markup relation (5) have been estimated, for the period
1970-2006, as:
êzt = (pt − ulct) + 0.43
(0.11)
(pt − pmt)− 12.74
(2.21)
∆pt + const. (6)
The estimated adjustment coefficients, reported in the Appendix B, show that all the vari-
ables react to the disequilibria in the markup relation12. However, as it can be expected for
the inflation rate and the markup over labour costs, it seems quite strange for the markup over
import prices. However, this is not so unrealistic if we re-write the price of imports in the
12A LR test rejects the null hypothesis that (pmt− pt) does not react to disequilibria in the murkup relation.
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following way
pmt = ext + pm
f
t
where ext is the log of an effective exchange rate (i.e., trade weighted exchange rate) and pm
f
t
is the price of imports in foreign currencies (logged). The adjustment towards the equilibrium
thus can happen either through the domestic price level pt or thorough the exchange rate ext
(or a combination of the two). Moreover, the relation (5) describes the influence of the exchange
rates on prices. More precisely, the quantity
pmt − pt = ext + pm
f
t − pt
can be seen as a measure of the real exchange rate, which might play an important role for
the dynamics of prices in a turbulent environment such as the post-Bretton Woods period,
characterized by many international crisis.
3.3 Wages, Productivity and Unemployment
The debate whether inflation and labour market are connected for developed economies, started
with the well known contribution by Phillips (1958), is still open from both theoretical and
empirical point of view (see, Ball and Mankiw 2002, and Gal˘ı et al. 2001). Such relation seems
to be confirmed by the European experience, which, in accordance with the ERM priorities
switched from high-employment policies to restrictive monetary policies in order to reduce
inflation and stabilize exchange rates.
The Italian economy, particularly, offers an interesting case study in that, in addition to the
changes following the growing European integration process, experienced several idiosyncratic
features such as the wage indexation (Scala Mobile), operative until the beginning of the ’90s.
As already mentioned in previous sections, many sectors of the Italian economy have expe-
rienced structural changes around the first years of the ’80s. Marcellino and Mizon (2001a),
in analyzing Italian labour market and wage-price formation, indicate the 1980 as the break-
ing point between the two stable periods. However, even more strong evidence of structural
changes can be seen when the empirical analysis is conducted in parallel with the monetary
transmission mechanism changes, which fixes the 1982 as the switching year. In fact, splitting
the sample between 1970-82 and 1983-2006, enforces the evidence of such changes.
The empirical analysis, thus, has been conducted through the cointegrated VAR approach
for the split samples 1970-82 and 1983-2006; see Appendix B for further details on the empirical
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Figure 8: prices and wages, real wages, unamployment and inflation, and labour share.
analysis. The variables included in the VAR model are:
Xt = (wt − pt, yt − lt, ut,∆pt)
′
where wt−pt is the log of real wages, yt−lt is a simple measure of productivity in log terms, ut is
the log of the percentage of unemployment rate and ∆pt is the usual inflation rate. A restricted
trend t is also included, together with unrestricted intervention dummies13. Considering this
information set we expect at least one cointegrating relation in both periods, involving inflation
rate and unemployment, as in a standard Phillips curve.
The empirical results for the two sub-periods highlight two equilibrium relations for both the
first and second period. Although there is no clear cut evidence, the choice of two cointegrating
relations in the first period seems to be the most plausible one, after a joint analysis of the
trace test and the observation of the characteristic roots under the restricted and unrestricted
models. The non rejected cointegrating relations, with a p− value = 0.23, are
êst = (wt − pt) + 0.081
(0.057)
ut − 1.705
(0.119)
(yt − lt) + const
= st + 0.081ut − 0.705 (yt − lt) + const
where st = (wt − pt)− (yt − lt) is the log of the labour share, and
êpcIt = ∆pt + 0.022
(0.013)
ut − 0.554
(0.099)
(yt − lt − 0.005t) + const
13All variables appear to be non stationary and in particular, while yt, lt, ut, and ∆pt are integrated of order
one, wt and pt are likely to be integrated of order two. A linear combination of the two (wt − pt), however,
cointegrates from I (2) to I (1) letting the whole system Xt to be integrated of order one, and allowing the
empirical analysis to be computed through the well known I (1) cointegration techniques. This can still be seen
as a “nominal-to-real transformation” in the sense of Kongsted (2003, 2005).
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Figure 9: deviations from long-run equilibria in the labour market for the first and second
period.
where (yt − lt − 0.005t) can be seen as a measure of the output gap. The first long-run relation
indicates that labour share decreases with unemployment and increases with per capita output.
Figure 9 indicates an unusual increase of the labour share during the ’70s which is not
consistent with a Cobb-Douglas technology and not typical for a wider historical perspective.
Labour share increasing with output per capita can be interpreted as a signal of the strong
power of employed labour. In fact, an increase in output per capita is associated with a more
than proportional increase in real wages. This might be a consequence of the wage indexation
system operative during the second half of this period. The negative effect of unemployment
on labour share can be interpreted as weak demand for labour, as in Sargan (1964).
The second cointegrating relation indicates that inflation decreases with an increase in
unemployment, but increases with positive output gap. This relation thus can be interpreted
as an augmented Phillips curve.
For the second period the trace test indicates, in a quite clear way, the presence of two coin-
tegrating relations. The first one is a relation which connects productivity and unemployment:
êput = (y − l)− 0.255
(0.021)
u− 0.003
(0.004)
t+ const.
The second relation highlights that the accelerating Phillips curve continues to hold, but
with different long-run elasticities. In particular, the relation becomes
êpcIIt = ∆pt + 0.184
(0.016)
ut − 0.679
(0.041)
(yt − lt − 0.004t) + const
with higher parameters both for unemployment and the output gap with respect to the previous
period. The overidentifying restrictions can not be rejected by a χ2 (4) = 1.84, with a p−value =
0.40.
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Concerning the adjustment coefficients, reported in Appendix B, it is interesting to note
that the unemployment rate is weakly exogenous for the long-run coefficients in the first period,
while helps reaching the equilibrium in both the long-run relations in the second period. The
inflation rate, instead, reacts to disequilibria in both long-run relations, in the two subsamples.
This result highlights, as will be discussed in the next section, the notable role played by
productivity and labour market in determining the inflation dynamics.
4 A model for the Italian Inflation
In this section we propose a structural model for the Italian inflation. The idea is to model the
national economy by means of an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand equation. The
aggregate supply is specified as a sort of “hybrid” Phillips curve where, however, we do not
explicitly model the expected future inflation rate14. The aggregate demand is modelled by an
equation for the growth rate of the GDP, which we expect to react to the real interest rate and
the real effective exchange rate, which, in our case, is incorporated in the import price index.
The model is completed by an equation for the determination of the interest rate, interpretable
as a Taylor rule equation.
The modelling strategy consists in the specification of a multivariate reduced form model
for the stationary vector (∆2pt,∆yt,∆ibt) and, following the “general to specific” approach, we
arrive to a structural form which can not be rejected by the data but, at the same time, can
help us in investigating which theoretical explanation mainly contributed to explain the Italian
inflation15. Among the regressors we include one period lagged first differences of real variables
and interest rates (which behave as I (1) processes), and one period lagged second differences
of nominal variables included in the analysis of all sectors of the Italian economy16. Moreover
14The inclusion of expectations in the empirical versions of the price determination models requires some
restrictions in order to separately identify the effects of expected future variables. If the model is specified
with unconstrained leads and legs, it will be difficult for the data to distinguish between the leads, which solve
out as restricted combinations of lag variables, and unrestricted lags. Such restrictions might become quite
complicated when, as in our case, one thinks of a combination of causes as the most plausible explanation for
the dynamics of prices. In our case, in addition, we enrich the dynamics by the inclusion of error correction
terms and the restrictions for the identification of the contribution of expected and past inflation become nearly
intractable.
15See Hendry (1995), Hendry and Mizon (1993) and Juselius (1994) for detailed discussions of the “general-
to-specific” approach.
16The variables related to the credit market have been included only since 1983 because unavailable for most
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we include the Hodrick-Prescott measure of the output gap (gapt) and the second difference of
the nominal public debt (debtt). Some variables, in particular the second difference of nominal
wages ∆2wt, the second difference of the import prices ∆
2pmt, and the first difference of the
european interest rate ∆ieut (only for the post-EMU period), are considered as exogenously
determined and are allowed to enter simultaneously in the model in order to catch up possible
contemporaneous relations with the inflation rate. All the variables, thus, have been oppor-
tunely differentiated in order to estimate equations which are composed only by stationary
variables.
The main contribution of the paper, however, rests on the response analysis that prices
accelerating rate exerts on disequilibria stemming from all the main sectors of the Italian
economy. In the following sub-sections, for each historical phase, we report only the inflation
equation, leaving the details for the other two equations in Appendix C. Economic interpretation
and policy considerations are reported in Section 4.3.
4.1 The fiscal dominance and the high inflation period: 1970-82
According to Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), the 70s’ can be considered as “an unprecedent
inflationary process in peace time in terms of level and persistence”. During this decade,
monetary policy has been more accommodating than fiscal policy and such behavior created
a vicious circle in the sense that favored the expansion of indebtness compelling monetary
authorities to further expand the creation of money. According to the monetarist interpretation,
excess money supply is the main cause of the high and persistent growth rate of prices over
those years.
The model proposed in this work, however, analyzes the monetary interpretation jointly with
other possible explanations of the Italian inflation. All disequilibria discussed above, along with
all variables included in the cointegration analyses, have been included in a structural error-
correcting model which, after a reduction process of insignificant determinants, can be written
as:
∆2pt = 0.002
(0.001)
+ 0.325
(0.124)
∆2pt−1 + 0.226
(0.094)
∆2pt−2 + 0.263
(0.064)
∆2wt + 0.166
(0.066)
∆2wt−1 + (7)
0.105
(0.025)
∆(mt−1 − pt−1) + 0.147
(0.070)
gapt−1 − 0.033
(0.007)
êzt−1 + 0.044
(0.008)
D7401 + 0.012
(0.007)
D7601 + ε1t
The reduction process is strongly accepted by the data; the LR test of thirty overidentifying
part of the first period.
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restrictions (for all the three equations) does not reject the null with a p− value = 0.17 while
all the diagnostic tests are insignificant17. The graphs of actual and fitted data are reported in
Figure 10 (left panel).
As already said, a stable money demand can not be estimated for these years but the signif-
icant coefficient associated to the growth rate of the real money supply seems to be consistent
with the monetary interpretation. Other components however seem to play a relevant role such
as the cost-push effects and the dynamics of nominal wages18. In particular, the growth rate
of the real money supply explains the 20% of the variability of the inflation growth rate, while
the cost push effects account for the 41% (23% for the markup error correction term and 18%
for the contemporaneous and lagged wages). The output gap, instead, explains the 16% of the
variability. As expected, the intervention dummies included in the model to account for the
instabilities of the first oil crisis are strongly significant.
4.2 The process of disinflation and the EMU Period: 1983-2006
During the first years of the 80s’ monetary authorities acquired a greater independence from
the Treasury and, even as a consequence of the adhesion to the EMS, the monetary policy
recorded positive changes. The direct control of monetary aggregates and the stabilization
of the exchange rate in line with the ERM pursued during the ’80s, however, have not been
sufficient to reach a low level of inflation compared to other developed countries such as Germany
and the US, and led to an overvaluation of the lira exchange rate which caused the crisis of
1992. After that crisis, however, the inflation curbing process continued and led to the respect
of the Maastricht criteria to joining the euro with the first group of countries in 1999. During
the process of curbing inflation, however, policy interventions in different sectors of the economy
took place and contributed to the reduction first, and elimination thereafter, of the inflation
differential with the most virtuous european countries.
Although the debate whether the euro area does satisfy the Optimum Currency Area condi-
tions still continues, one unquestionable result is that the rate of inflation, for most part of the
17R2 = 0.81, AR 1-4 test: F (4, 25) = 0.63 (p− value = 0.93); ARCH 1-4 F (4, 31) = 0.59 (p− value = 0.67);
Normality test: χ2 (2) = 1.10 (p− value = 0.58).
18The disequilibria from the long-run Phillips curve and the labour-share relation, which entered significantly
in the inflation equation as reported in Section 3.3, in equation (8) becomes not significant when including the
disequilibria from the markup relation. In other words, the cost-push effects are more strongly captured by the
markup relation rather than the disequilibria from the labour market and productivity.
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Figure 10: Actual and fitted values for the two periods: 1970-1982 (left panel), 1983-2006 (right
panel)
participating countries, remained quite stable over the low levels reached in 1999. Of course,
some differences still exist, but such differentials can not be compared to the past situation.
The inflation equation, after the reduction process, becomes
∆2pt = −0.001
(0.000)
− 0.002
(0.111)
∆2pt−1 − 0.125
(0.092)
∆2pt−2 + 0.218
(0.043)
∆2wt − 0.012
(0.004)
êzt−1 (8)
+0.098
(0.048)
gapt−1 − 0.001
(0.000)
êρt−1 + 0.026
(0.012)
êloant−1 − 0.267
(0.075)
êput−1 − 0.445
(0.113)
êpcIIt−1 + ε2t.
The overidentifying restrictions for all the three equations can not be rejected with a p −
value = 0.92 while all the diagnostic tests are insignificant19. The growth rate of inflation during
the period 1983-2006 is influenced only marginally by its past values but strongly depends on
the dynamics of wages. As for the previous period, cost-push effects continuous to play an
important role, while the quantity of money seems to be irrelevant. The monetary policy seems
to enter through the credit markets. The dynamics of wages accounts for almost 30% of the
variability, while the disequilibria on the labour market and productivity explain the 33% of
the variability jointly. Although less than in the previous period, the markup error-correction
term explains approximately the same share of the inflation dynamics than the monetary and
credit variables (11% and 12% respectively). Actual and fitted data are reported in Figure 10
(right panel).
In Figure 11 we report the sequential Chow tests for the presence of a structural break at
time t, where t belongs to the interval 1990-2006. The figure shows that for each equation and
19R2 = 0.62, AR 1-5 test: F (6, 59) = 1.93 (p−value = 0.09); ARCH 1-4: F (4, 75) = 0.18 (p−value = 0.95);
Normality test: χ2 (2) = 1.18 (p− value = 0.56).
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Figure 11: Sequential Chow tests for the presence of structural breaks
for the system as a whole the null hypothesis of no structural break cannot be rejected for any
t in the sample20.
A further confirmation of the absence of a structural break is that the same overidentifying
restrictions imposed in the model for the period 1983-2006 cannot be rejected both for the period
1983-1998 (with a p− value = 0.89) and for the period 1999-2006 (with a p− value = 0.14).
Moreover, significant tests for the equality of the coefficients in the two sub-periods do
never reject the null. However, by observing the unconditional correlations reported in Section
2, relaxing the constraint on the nominal wages ∆2wt we obtain that over the pre-EMU period
the inflation rate does not depend on the dynamics of nominal wages while during the EMU
the coefficient becomes positive and strongly significant.
4.3 Model interpretation and policy considerations
The empirical analysis presented in this work suggests interesting considerations about a) the
policies pursued by the Italian economic authorities in order to curbing inflation during the
three decades preceding the Euro, and b) the determinants of the price dynamics once the
monetary authority changed toward the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.
The first consideration is that excess money supply can not account for all the variability
observed in the price acceleration rate over the whole sample. Variables and disequilibria from
20This is true for any conventional significant level and not simply for the 5% as reported for semplicity in
the figure.
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the other sectors of the Italian economy enter the relation with correct signs and significant
coefficients. The idea that the two digit inflation during the ’70s was a consequence of the high
growth rate of the money supply and that once controlled for that, the inflation reached more
reasonable values, seems to be partially contradicted by the empirical evidence.
The importance of cost-push effects is confirmed by the fact that prices significantly error-
correct in both sub-samples towards the stable long-run relation between inflation and the
markup found in Section 3.2. It is important to note, however, that such long-run relation
includes also the exchange rate effects, and the higher error-correction coefficient observed in
the first period has likely to be ascribed to the international market shocks due to the oil crisis
of the ’70s. The importance of the exchange rate channel is confirmed by the significant impact
provided by the import prices in the interest rate and growth equations, particularly during
the second period21.
During the four decades 1970-2006, the labour market has experienced many structural and
institutional changes which, as expected, can not be considered as completely independent to the
inflation dynamics. In fact, the significant adjustments towards the productivity-unemployment
long-run relation and towards the accelerating Phillips curve in the 1983-2006 period confirm
this statement. Moreover, the inclusion of the wage accelerating rate in the first period high-
lights the role of the vicious circle exerted by the wage indexation “Scala mobile”, operative
since the second half of the ’70s. The dynamics of wages, in addition, reveals to be extremely
important during second period too.
Although not directly included in the model, the contribution of expectations in the mech-
anism of price formation might be deduced from the strong significance of the wages in both
periods. Price expectations, in fact, directly affect wages, which feed back to the GDP deflator
and to the consumer prices. Our results are consistent with those of Gaiotti et al. (1998),
although they consider only the period 1985-9622.
As already mentioned, monetary aggregates play a relevant role. During the first period
in fact, real money growth rate enters significantly the relation. During the ’80s and the ’90s,
21In order to better understand the impact of the exchange rate and other international variables, one pos-
sibility could be to consider a Global VAR (GVAR) model as in the spirit of Pesaran et al. (2004) and Dees
et al. (2007). In this context it would be possible to explore the international likages of the Italian economy,
including trade and financial relationships. This is however an interesting argument for future research.
22However, Gaiotti et al. (1998) estimate a VAR model where both wages and price expectations are included
in the information set.
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however, the restrictive interventions operated by monetary authorities have been conducted
through interest rates rather than money supply. Neither the amount of money, nor the dise-
quilibria from the money demand relation do enter significantly in the inflation equation. This
result is at odds with the common wisdom that excess money supply directly affects prices.
Moreover, interest rate maneuvers might have more direct effects on price of loans rather than
to the quantity of money. This could be one of the possible explanations of the significant
adjustments towards disequilibria on the credit market, especially the interest rate of loans.
In this context, the interest rate of loans could be seen as the most indicative interest rate
through which monetary policy interventions affect aggregate demand. This statement is not
a point in favor of the presence of a credit channel, but rather a remark that monetary and
credit channels can not be discussed separately (see, e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
If the interest rate on loans does reflect the interest rate intervention of the monetary
authorities, also the control of the quantity of loans could be effective at reducing inflation.
Bertocco (1997) has shown the difficulties of monetary authorities in controlling the monetary
base, and consequently the quantity of loans, in a period of high inflation such as the ’70s.
During these years, monetary authorities decided to directly control the stock of loans by
imposing administrative ceilings. These measures, however, allowed commercial banks to face
restrictive monetary policies through changes of their assets composition. During the ’80s and
the first years of the ’90s monetary squeezes have not been accompanied by a reduction of
bank loans, with the exception of the one in 1992-93, when however the reduction has to be
attributed to a drop in demand rather than in supply of loans. This failure in controlling the
stock of loans could have reduced, thus, the effectiveness of restrictive monetary policies.
According to Bertocco et al. (2002) and Juselius (2001), monetary policy could affect the
inflation rate through its influence on production costs. However, if it seems reasonable to
believe that monetary policy could influence production costs through e.g. the cost of loans,
it is also clear that many other factors can influence production costs. A restrictive monetary
policy, combined with income and fiscal policies, in fact, has reached the most important results
at curbing inflation during the three decades preceding the entry of Italy to the EMU. This
statement is confirmed by the empirical analysis. In fact, the high and persistent levels of public
debt during the first period are captured by the monetary aggregates and the fiscal variables do
not enter significantly the relation. During the second period conversely, both monetary and
fiscal variables play a relevant role in explaining inflation. In fact, although the fiscal variables
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do not enter directly the inflation equation, in the equation for the interest rate determination,
it is shown as the monetary authorities take care about the debt dynamics when fixing the
policy interest rate.
The strong manoeuvre aimed at reducing the public deficit/GDP in 1992 and the agreements
reached by the government and trade unions in 1993 are a signal in this sense and can explain
the more effectiveness of the economic policies during the ’90s rather than during the ’80s. In
fact, while during the ’80s economic policies were based on monetary instruments only, during
the ’90s they were also accompanied by income and fiscal policies as discussed above.
Another important point concerns the connections between the institutional changes follow-
ing the adhesion to the EMU and the mechanism of price formation. The empirical evidence
confirms, even from a macroeconomic point of view, the results in Angeloni et al. (2006) that
almost nothing did change with the adoption of the euro, at least for the Italian case. The
sequential Chow tests, reported in Figure 11, show that if something did change, although not
significantly, it happened well before the 1999, probably due to the uncertainties associated with
the fragile situation of the Italian economy around the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigated the determinants of inflation in Italy since the beginning of the
’70s till the first years after the launch of the EMU. Structural and institutional changes in
many sectors of the Italian economy suggest to take into account the possibility of splitting
the sample period into three sub-samples and modelling the dynamics of inflation differently
for each of the periods. While this is the case for the first years of the ’80s, an appropriate
robustness analysis rejects the hypothesis of different mechanisms of price formation before and
after the adhesion to the EMU in 1999.
The first conclusion is that the interpretation of inflation as a pure monetary phenomenon,
which seems to be confirmed by a simple critical inspection of the data, is questionable.
Cost-push effects, which also include world price inflation and exchange rate instability,
play a relevant role, both in the short and long run. Labour market disequilibria also offer a
substantial contribution in explaining the dynamics of prices.
The common wisdom that excess money supply influences prices is confirmed by the empir-
ical results, even if, since the beginning of the ’80s the credit transmission mechanism needs to
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be considered. In particular, over the ’80s and the ’90s the restrictive interventions operated
by the Italian monetary authorities have been conducted through interest rates rather than
money supply, and the interest rate on loans does reflect such interventions. This can explain
the failure of the economic policies aimed at curbing inflation during the ’80s, based solely on
controlling the money growth.
The finding that several theories do matter in determining the Italian inflation explains why
a combination of monetary, income and fiscal policies pursued after the exchange rate crisis in
1992, has been more effective than in the ’80s, only based on monetary instruments, and helped
Italy to joining the euro in 1999.
During the first years of the EMU, as for the previous period, cost push effects, as well as
disequilibria from the credit and labour sectors reveal to be the main drivers of the dynamics of
prices. From a broader point of view, these conclusions are of extremely importance in acting
at reducing the inflation differentials among euro area countries.
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Appendix A: The data
yt =log of real GDP,seasonally adjusted (ISTAT)
mt =log of stock of money measured as M2 less
the stock of certificates of deposits of all maturities (Bank of Italy)
loant =log of deflated total amount of loans (Bank of Italy)
pt =log of implicit GDP deflator (ISTAT)
∆pt =inflation rate (∆pt = pt − pt−1)
rt =log of deflated total amount of reserves held by banks
at the central bank (Bank of Italy)
ibt =average interest rate on Treasury Bills with maturity
3, 6 and 12 months (BOT, Bank of Italy)
ρt =average interest rate on loans (Bank of Italy)
idt =average interest rate on deposits (Bank of Italy)
iuet =short term maturity european interest rate (from Favero and Giglio, 2006)
lt =log of total employment, seasonally adjusted (ISTAT)
wt =log of nominal average earnings, seasonally adjusted (ISTAT)
ulct =log of nominal unit labour costs (ulct = wt − (yt − lt), ISTAT)
pmt =log of tariff-adjusted total import price index (including energy, ISTAT)
ut =log of unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted (ISTAT)
iuet =short-term european interest rate (from Favero and Giglio, 2006)
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Appendix B: Cointegration analyses
In this appendix we sum up the results of the cointegration analyses performed to obtain
the disequilibria from the main sectors of the Italian economy.
Money and credit markets
The cointegration analysis follows what proposed by Fanelli and Paruolo (2003). The
VAR(2) model includes the following information set:
Xt = (mt − pt, yt, ibt, idt,∆pt, ρt, loanst, rt)
′ .
A deterministic trend and a structural dummy D923, with a peak in 1992:3, have been included
to lie in the cointegration space while centered quarterly dummies and a further dummy variable
to account for occasional credit ceilings have been included unrestricted. The inclusion of the
restricted dummy D923 aims to capture the effects of the exchange rate speculative attack
against the lira observed around 1992. The model has been estimated over the period 1983:1-
1998:4.
The trace test, as shown in Table 1, suggests the presence of either five or six cointegrating
relations. As discussed in Fanelli and Paruolo (1999), however, a possible I (2) common trend
can characterize the series involved, even if difficult to be interpreted form the economic point
of view. The choice of rank = 5, and consequently three unit roots in the system, has to be
preferred once observing for the roots of the characteristic polynomial in the restricted VAR
model. However, the presence of a further potential unit root in the restricted model is one
more evidence of the presence of a common I (2) stochastic trend23.
The estimated cointegrating relations are reported in Table 2. The LR test for the overi-
dentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 (14) under the null, is not significant
with a p-value of 0.115.
r ≤ j 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
trace
(p−value)
283.7
(0.000)
201.3
(0.000)
153.7
(0.000)
112
(0.000)
73.28
(0.006)
46.18
(0.021)
21.91
(0.145)
7.35
(0.319)
Table 2: trace test in the restricted trend I(1) model; 1983:1-1998:2.
23The test statistic proposed by Rahbek et al. (1999) for investigating the presence of I (2) components does
not reject the hypothesis of five cointegrating relation and one I (2) common trend.
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Cointegrating relations
êmt = (mt − pt − yt) + 0.53
(0.28)
(ibt − idt) + 0.0084
(0.0002)
t+ const
êρt = ρt − ibt − 0.37
(0.04)
idt − 0.028
(0.0035)
(yt − rt) + const
êloant = (loant − yt) + 7.5
(1.13)
ρt − 15.1
(1.14)
ibt − 0.014
(0.001)
t+ const
êyt = yt + 0.45
(0.08)
(ibt −∆pt)− 0.064
(0.01)
rt − 0.0069
(0.0002)
t+ const
êit = it −∆pt − 0.029
(0.0025)
D923 + const
Adjustment coefficients
êmt êρt êloant êyt êit
∆(mt − pt) −0.352
(0.146)
0.016
(0.008)
−0.038
(0.058)
−0.928
(0.322)
−0.163
(0.139)
∆yt −0.007
(0.048)
0.066
(0.027)
0.026
(0.019)
0.112
(0.107)
0.077
(0.046)
∆ibt 0.042
(0.063)
−0.944
(0.356)
0.103
(0.025)
0.400
(0.139)
−0.277
(0.060)
∆idt 0.022
(0.021)
−0.283
(0.117)
0.015
(0.008)
0.022
(0.046)
−0.043
(0.020)
∆2pt 0.425
(0.107)
−0.022
(0.006)
0.138
(0.043)
0.919
(0.236)
0.355
(0.101)
∆ρt 0.056
(0.033)
−0.953
(0.183)
0.060
(0.013)
0.276
(0.072)
−0.127
(0.030)
∆loant −0.054
(0.108)
0.016
(0.006)
−0.070
(0.043)
0.106
(0.237)
−0.162
(0.102)
∆rt −1.467
(0.409)
−0.031
(0.023)
0.483
(0.163)
1.224
(0.900)
−0.449
(0.389)
Table 3: cointegrating relations and adjustment coefficients for the money and credit market;
1983:1-1998:2. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Markup, Labour Costs and Import Prices
The markup-inflation relation is analyzed through a VAR(4) model for
Xt = (pt − ulct, pt − pmt,∆pt)
′ .
An impulse dummy D741 has been included in order to capture part of the instability caused
by the first oil shock. The analysis is performed over the period 1970:1-2006:4.
All variables appear to be integrated of order one and the trace test, reported in Table
3, strongly supports only one cointegrating relation with two I (1) trends24. The estimated
cointegrating relation is
êzt = (pt − ulct) + 0.43
(0.11)
(pt − pmt)− 12.74
(2.21)
∆pt + const
which is stable over the whole sample period.
r ≤ j 0 1 2
trace
(p−value)
33.26
(0.018)
8.80
(0.391)
2.749
(0.097)
Table 4: trace test; 1970:1-2006:4.
Adjustment Coefficients
pt − ulct pt − pmt ∆pt
êzt −0.042
(0.011)
−0.049
(0.031)
−0.022
(0.007)
Table 5: Adjustment coefficients for the markup model; 1970:1-2006:4.
Wages, Productivity and Unemployment
As already mentioned in Section 3.3, the cointegration analysis has been conducted by split-
ting the sample into two sub-samples in order to account for the structural changes discussed
above. The information set is the same in both systems and consists of
Xt = (wt − pt, yt − lt, ut,∆pt)
′ .
24The I (2) test in Paruolo (1996) has been performed and does exclude the presence of I (2) components,
confirming thus the nominal-to-real transformation in the sense of Kongsted (1998, 2002)
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r ≤ j 0 1 2 3
First period
(1970-1982)
trace
(p−value)
72.29
(0.007)
38.68
(0.125)
10.90
(0.876)
3.77
(0.771)
Second Period
(1983-2006)
trace
(p−value)
94.64
(0.000)
44.90
(0.029)
10.02
(0.918)
2.30
(0.930)
Table 6: trace test for the two periods.
cointegrating relations LR test
First period
(1970-1982)
êst = (wt − pt) + 0.081
(0.057)
ut − 1.705
(0.119)
(yt − lt) + const χ
2 (2) = 3.05
p−value=0.22
êpcIt = ∆pt + 0.022
(0.013)
ut − 0.554
(0.099)
(yt − lt − 0.005t) + const
Second Period
(1983-2006)
êput = (yt − lt)− 0.250
(0.021)
ut − 0.004
(0.0003)
t+ const χ2 (4) = 1.84
p−value=0.40
êpcIIt = ∆pt + 0.180
(0.016)
ut − 0.673
(0.041)
(yt − lt − 0.004t) + const
Table 7: cointegrating relations and LR tests for overidentyfing restrictions for the two periods.
Standard errors in parentheses.
A deterministic trend restricted to lie in the cointegration space and several unrestricted inter-
vention dummies have been included to model instabilities due to the two oil shocks, changes
in measures of the unemployment rate and the speculative attack to the lira around 1992. The
two sub-samples correspond to 1970-82 and 1983-2006; a VAR model with two lags has been
estimated for both periods. All variables appear to be integrated of order one in each of the
sub-samples and in the whole sample, making the standard I (1) cointegration techniques the
most suitable to perform the analysis.
For the first period, the trace test suggests only one cointegrating relation but, the low
power of the test for small samples as the present one and a more accurate investigation of the
roots of the characteristic polynomial in the restricted and unrestricted VAR(2) model suggest
an overall preference for two cointegrating relations and two I (1) common trends.
For the second period, there seems to be less doubts for the choice of two cointegrating
relations. The results of the trace tests and the estimated cointegrating relations are reported
in Table 4 and Table 5. The LR tests of the overidentifying restrictions for the two periods are
also reported in Table 5.
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Adjustment coefficients: 1970-1982
∆(wt − pt) ∆ut ∆(yt − lt) ∆pt
êst −0113
(0.081)
0 0.204
(0.042)
0.120
(0.063)
êpcIt 0.297
(0.212)
0 −0.220
(0.111)
−0.858
(0.165)
Table 8: Adjustment coefficients for the labour market in the first period. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Adjustment coefficients: 1983-2006
∆(wt − pt) ∆ut ∆(yt − lt) ∆pt
êst −0.077
(0.041)
−1.072
(0.037)
−0.182
(0.037)
−0.515
(0.083)
êpcIIt 0 −1.244
(0.606)
0 −0.925
(0.134)
Table 9: Adjustment coefficients for the labour market in the second period. Standard errors
in parentheses.
Appendix C: Structural model for the Italian inflation
In this appendix we report, for each sub-sample, the estimated equations of the structural
model discussed in Section 4.
First period: 1970-1982
∆2pt = 0.002
(0.001)
+ 0.325
(0.124)
∆2pt−1 + 0.226
(0.094)
∆2pt−2 + 0.263
(0.064)
∆2wt + 0.166
(0.066)
∆2wt−1+
0.105
(0.025)
∆(mt−1 − pt−1) + 0.147
(0.070)
gapt−1 − 0.033
(0.007)
êzt−1 + 0.044
(0.008)
D7401 + 0.012
(0.007)
D7601 + ε1t
∆yt = −0.055
(0.087)
∆2pt−1 + 0.180
(0.069)
∆2pt−2 + 0.589
(0.086)
∆yt−1 − 0.590
(0.410)
∆idt−1 + 0.261
(0.059)
∆2wt
−0.025
(0.016)
∆2pmt + 0.041
(0.030)
∆2debtt + 0.043
(0.026)
∆(mt−1 − pt−1)− 0.170
(0.079)
gapt−1
+0.019
(0.006)
êzt−1 + 0.178
(0.054)
êst−1 − 0.220
(0.124)
êpcIt−1 + 0.014
(0.007)
D7401 + εy1t
∆ibt = 0.122
(0.030)
∆2pt−1 + 0.055
(0.027)
∆2wt−1 + 0.073
(0.024)
gapt−1 + 0.022
(0.003)
D7601 + εi1t
Second period: 1983-2006
∆2pt = −0.001
(0.000)
− 0.002
(0.111)
∆2pt−1 − 0.125
(0.092)
∆2pt−2 + 0.218
(0.043)
∆2wt − 0.012
(0.004)
êzt−1
+0.098
(0.048)
gapt−1 − 0.001
(0.000)
êρt−1 + 0.026
(0.012)
êloant−1 − 0.267
(0.075)
êput−1 − 0.445
(0.113)
êpcIIt−1 + ε2t
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∆yt = 0.002
(0.001)
+ 0.200
(0.093)
∆yt−1 + 0.174
(0.100)
∆yt−2 − 0.023
(0.016)
∆2pmt + 0.021
(0.016)
∆2pmt−1 + 0.037
(0.020)
∆2debtt−1
−0.014
(0.004)
êρt−1 + 0.075
(0.030)
êloant−1 − 0.238
(0.057)
gapt−1 − 0.093
(0.030)
êput−1 + εy2t
∆ibt = −0.0003
(0.0002)
+ 0.342
(0.114)
∆ibt−1 − 0.006
(0.004)
∆(mt−1 − pt−1)− 0.036
(0.018)
∆2wt + 0.017
(0.006)
∆2pmt−1 + 0.013
(0.008)
∆2debtt
+0.062
(0.018)
êloant−1 − 0.001
(0.001)
êzt−1 + 0.084
(0.023)
gapt−1 + εi2t
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